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ABSTRACT: In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade 
taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts 
on taxpayers’ reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused 
approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of 
about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure 
programs, by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were 
concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures 
increased annual reported capital income by $2-$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6-$1.2 billion 
in additional tax revenue. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of secret offshore accounts to evade tax liabilities is a serious challenge for tax policy. One 
prominent study estimates that households around the world hold $6 trillion in offshore banking 
centers, amounting to about 8% of total household financial wealth (Zucman, 2013). Other research 
suggests that, at least in one set of countries, offshore wealth is highly concentrated at the top of the 
wealth distribution and almost never reported to the tax authorities (Alstadsæter, Johannesen and 
Zucman, 2019). The size and concentration of offshore wealth suggests that improved tax 
enforcement for offshore income and wealth could generate substantial revenue and perhaps also 
large social welfare gains, but it is not straightforward to achieve in a world of extremely mobile 
financial assets and foreign tax havens1 with institutionalized financial secrecy.  
In response to this challenge, beginning in 2008 the U.S. government conducted a series of 
enforcement initiatives aimed at offshore accounts of its citizens. First, it compelled a number of tax 
havens to accept information exchange agreements under which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
can request account information about U.S. taxpayers suspected of tax evasion. Second, it took ad hoc 
legal measures to force major Swiss banks, most famously the world’s biggest private bank, UBS, to 
turn over names and account details of many of their U.S. customers. Finally, complementing the 
measures aiming to facilitate detection of undeclared offshore income, it established a series of 
programs under which cooperating U.S. taxpayers who voluntarily disclose their previously 
unreported offshore accounts and the taxable income they generate are subject to reduced penalties 
and avoid criminal sanctions. Many countries have pursued very similar policies, combining cross-
border exchange of banking information and incentives to self-declare foreign assets.  
This paper uses comprehensive administrative data to estimate compliance responses to the 
bundle of U.S. enforcement efforts starting in 2008. From a policy perspective, it is important to know 
how effective the global wave of enforcement has been in fostering tax compliance and raising tax 
revenue, but the available evidence is scant and indirect.2 We analyze data on reported foreign accounts 
 
1 We use the term tax haven loosely to indicate jurisdictions with low effective tax rates and a sufficient commitment to 
financial secrecy so as to be attractive to foreigners desiring to shield income from home-country taxation. There is no 
single universally accepted list of such jurisdictions, and being so designated is often disputed by named countries. In 
Section 5, for descriptive analyses we make use of the countries meeting the 2000 OECD definition of uncooperative tax 
havens. In these analyses, we also show by-country information separately for all countries. This list does not have any 
official role in IRS enforcement efforts; the IRS does not have an officially accepted definition of a tax haven. 
2 Langenmayr (2017) shows that U.S.-owned deposits in offshore jurisdictions increased in 2009 relative to a synthetic 
control group and interprets this as evidence that the OVD was associated with an increase in offshore tax evasion. 
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from Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBARs), which must be filed annually by U.S. 
taxpayers when the total value of their foreign accounts exceeds $10,000. We combine these data on 
reported foreign accounts with information on participation in Offshore Voluntary Disclosure (OVD) 
programs and income reported on tax returns. Combining these data sets permits us to study the effect 
of enforcement on account disclosures and income reporting not only for OVD participants, but also 
for any individuals who disclosed “quietly,” by beginning to report a foreign account and income in 
that account without entering OVD. 
We begin by documenting a sharp increase in the number of self-reported foreign accounts 
that coincides with the enhanced enforcement efforts. In each of the years 2005 through 2008, 
approximately 40,000 U.S. residents filed an FBAR for the first time, disclosing that they owned 
foreign accounts. Many of these were presumably taxpayers who simply opened their first foreign 
account and duly filed an FBAR. In 2009, the number of first-time FBAR filers more than doubled to 
about 90,000 individuals.3 The steep increase is suggestive that a large number of taxpayers - a simple 
difference estimate would be around 50,000 individuals - disclosed previously unreported foreign 
accounts in response to the new enforcement policies. Only about 15,000 of the first-time FBAR filers 
in 2009 participated in the voluntary disclosure program, suggesting that much of the compliance 
response - a simple difference estimate would imply around 35,000 individuals - occurred in the form 
of “quiet disclosures” outside of the voluntary disclosure program. We estimate that the combined 
value of the accounts disclosed because of the enforcement efforts was just over $100 billion. 
This reading of the trends in FBAR reporting is consistent with patterns in the underlying 
microdata. The increase in first-time FBAR filings was disproportionately large for account types that 
are a priori more likely to play a role in tax evasion,4 even for those who did not participate in an OVD 
program. First, the increase was much larger for accounts in countries often characterized as tax 
havens than in other foreign countries. For instance, the number of first-time FBAR filings related to 
 
Hanlon, Maydew and Thornock (2015) show that information exchange treaties between the U.S. and offshore tax 
havens lead to a decrease in portfolio investment from the cooperating tax havens into the U.S., consistent with a 
decrease in “round-tripping” by U.S. households, but do not discuss whether this reflects an increase in tax compliance 
or shifting of evasive accounts to non-cooperating tax havens. Heckemeyer and Hemmerich (2018) find that 
information exchange treaties are associated with a significantly larger decline in foreign portfolio investment in tax 
havens than in non-tax-havens. 
3 The FBAR filers we study are single or joint individual owners of accounts disclosed on FBARs; we do not focus on 
businesses. We use the term individuals loosely throughout to refer to single or joint account owners. 
4 We use the term evasion referring to non-compliance with income or asset reporting. The paper studies “traces of 
evasion;" we do not have audit data or information on whether the individuals were charged with or convicted of tax 
evasion. Throughout the paper we use the terms non-compliance and evasion interchangeably. 
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accounts in the Cayman Islands grew from about 300 in 2008 to approximately 4,500 in 2009. Second, 
the increase was more pronounced for large accounts (above $1 million), which are more likely to 
serve investment rather than transactional purposes, than for smaller accounts (below $100,000). 
Third, there was no comparable increase in new FBAR filings by taxpayers residing outside of the 
U.S., who have a clear non-tax motive for holding a foreign account. New accounts disclosed by those 
previously filing an FBAR were also disproportionately high-value and concentrated in tax havens.  
Entering OVD required paying back taxes and substantial penalties, but eliminated the risk of 
more severe criminal penalties, while disclosing outside OVD allowed a taxpayer to avoid paying back 
taxes and penalties at the risk of harsher criminal penalties if evasion was later detected. We next try 
to understand the factors determining whether taxpayers disclosed inside or outside of the voluntary 
disclosure program. Under the assumption that the 2009 cohort of first-time FBAR filers would have 
resembled the 2008 cohort in the absence of expanded enforcement, we identify the characteristics of 
those induced to file by enforcement. Our findings support the notion that taxpayers decided to enter 
OVD when the risk of detection and prosecution for a quiet disclosure was sufficiently high, as those 
using the voluntary disclosure program were more likely to disclose a large account (with higher risk 
of criminal charges in case of detection), and to disclose an account in Switzerland (with a higher 
detection risk given the concurrent crackdown involving Swiss banks).  
To measure the effect of the enforcement initiatives on tax compliance, we are ultimately 
interested in whether new disclosure of foreign accounts is associated with a resulting increase in 
reported taxable income. Here, we turn to the data from income tax returns. We employ an event 
study methodology that allows us to estimate the increase in taxable capital income occurring when a 
taxpayer discloses foreign accounts for the first time. To account for the underlying trend in reported 
income, we include a comparison group of individuals who filed an FBAR and reported the same 
number of accounts in every year during our sample period. 
Not surprisingly, for individuals participating in the voluntary disclosure program—who have 
admitted to non-compliance—we estimate a sharp and substantial increase in reported taxable capital 
income after disclosure. More intriguingly, for first-time FBAR filers not participating in OVD—who 
have not admitted non-compliance—we also find a substantial increase in capital income in the first 
year of filing an FBAR, although with smaller relative effects than we observe for the OVD 
participants. 
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These results suggest that the unusually large group of first-time FBAR filers in 2009 includes 
a significant number of quiet disclosers, who started reporting foreign accounts and the capital income 
accruing to these accounts in response to the enforcement initiatives without admitting tax evasion, 
explicitly or implicitly. Three additional pieces of evidence support this interpretation. First, other 
types of income do not increase following disclosures. Second, the increase in capital income at the 
time of the first FBAR filing was not reflected in the third-party reports filed by domestic banks, 
suggesting that the income indeed was associated with foreign accounts. Third, we find that the 
probability of filing amended tax returns for previous tax years doubled after a first-time FBAR filing, 
although from a low baseline of around 3%. These facts bolster our claim that the effect on capital 
income reporting is being driven by quiet disclosures, and rule out alternative explanations.  
Finally, we estimate the total effect of the policy on reported taxable capital income and tax 
revenue. Depending on what assumptions we make to address the issue of heterogeneous effects of 
disclosure on reported income, we find that these enforcement initiatives increased capital income 
reporting by $2 to $4 billion annually, corresponding to $0.6 billion to $1.2 billion in annual tax 
revenue. Most of the total effect comes from quiet disclosers rather than OVD participants, although 
the dollar amount per individual is larger for OVD participants. 
To put these findings in perspective, it is instructive to compare our estimate of offshore 
wealth disclosed in 2009 because of the enforcement efforts, around $100 billion, to a recent estimate 
of total offshore wealth owned by U.S. households in roughly the same period of about $1,000 billion 
(Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, 2018). The growing literature on offshore tax evasion provides 
two potential explanations for why the enforcement efforts we study did not have a larger effect on 
tax compliance. One set of studies shows that targeted enforcement policies induce some owners of 
offshore accounts to adapt a new evasion strategy, for instance by moving assets to non-cooperative 
tax havens (Johannesen and Zucman, 2014; Johannesen, 2014; Menkhoff and Miethe, 2019) or by 
adding layers of secrecy in the form of anonymous shell corporations (Omartian, 2016). Additionally, 
a supply-side theory of offshore tax evasion predicts that increases in enforcement are more effective 
in inducing evaders with the smallest accounts to become compliant (Alstadsæter, Johannesen and 
Zucman, 2019).  
Our findings also inform current debates about the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA), a highly ambitious policy seeking to enhance tax enforcement by inducing foreign financial 
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institutions to report information to the IRS about all accounts held by U.S. taxpayers beginning in 
2015. Many observers have expressed reservations about FATCA, claiming that it involves significant 
administrative costs for banks (e.g., Jolly and Knowlton, 2011) and pointing to the compliance costs 
faced by U.S. citizens when setting up and maintaining foreign accounts for fully legitimate purposes 
(e.g., Jacobs, 2012). In the face of these concerns, the effectiveness of the enforcement initiatives 
preceding FATCA in deterring evasion is paramount. Our results suggest that the enforcement 
policies implemented prior to FATCA had a significant effect on aggregate tax compliance, but may 
have been limited by a lack of scope, and, thus that stronger policy instruments may be needed to 
ensure effective taxation of foreign accounts. Whether FATCA will significantly improve overall tax 
compliance, especially for very high-wealth individuals, will be an important task for future research, 
as data become available. 
2. Background: U.S. Enforcement Policy Initiatives Since 2009 
For decades, the use of offshore bank accounts for tax evasion was straightforward and involved a 
low risk of detection because the banking secrecy of foreign tax havens shielded tax evaders from 
investigations by the U.S. tax authorities. Starting in 2008, however, the U.S. government adopted a 
range of enforcement initiatives targeting owners of offshore accounts. The carrot-and-stick approach 
combined measures to increase the probability of detecting undeclared offshore accounts and a 
program providing incentives for tax evaders to voluntarily disclose their foreign assets. This paper 
seeks to understand the effects of this bundle of policies as a whole. Many other countries have since 
adopted a similar bundle of policies, including enhanced information exchanges and reduced penalties 
for disclosing offshore wealth. This section provides a summary of these enforcement initiatives.  
2.1 Ad hoc legal steps against Swiss banks 
When Bradley Birkenfeld, a former employee at the Swiss bank UBS, blew the whistle and revealed 
that the bank’s representatives were knowingly assisting U.S. individuals with tax fraud involving 
anonymous shell corporations and undeclared Swiss bank accounts, the U.S. government took the 
fight against offshore tax evasion to court. At the request of the Department of Justice, a federal judge 
in July 2008 authorized the tax authorities to requisition information from UBS about its U.S. 
customers without specifying the identities of these customers in advance, a so-called “John Doe 
summons.” A few months later, the FBI announced that UBS was under investigation for its role in 
tax evasion and several UBS executives, including the head of the wealth management division, Raoul 
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Weil, were indicted.5 
While the criminal case against UBS was settled in February 2009 with the bank agreeing to 
pay a fine of $780 million, the civil case about disclosure of customer lists had more far-reaching legal 
and political implications. The demand by the U.S. government that UBS provide details about its 
52,000 U.S. customers was a direct assault on the Swiss banking secrecy rules, under which UBS was 
required to protect the privacy of its customers and its executives would face criminal charges in 
Switzerland if customer lists were shared with the U.S. government. The case was settled in March 
2009, when the U.S. and Swiss governments agreed that UBS would reveal the identities of 4,450 
customers to the U.S. tax authorities by intermediation of the Swiss Financial Services Authority. How 
exactly 4,450 names were selected from the 52,000 demanded by U.S. authorities was never disclosed, 
but these are widely believed to have been the most egregious, wealthy tax evaders.6  
Apart from the UBS account holders directly named in the settlement, the outcome of the 
UBS case may have induced compliance responses among offshore tax evaders more broadly by 
demonstrating that the banking secrecy of foreign tax havens was no longer impenetrable, and instead 
could be effectively challenged in courts. Later, the U.S. government took a similar approach against 
a number of foreign banks with major wealth management divisions, issuing John Doe summonses 
against a number of other foreign banks, including HSBC, Credit Suisse and Wegelin & Co., and 
establishing a program for several Swiss banks to provide information on U.S. taxpayers. 
2.2 Information exchange  
At the same time as the U.S. government took ad hoc legal steps against individual banks to obtain 
information about their customers, it also pursued a broader agenda to improve its access to tax-
relevant information from foreign banks through bilateral information exchange agreements. In a first 
step, several countries believed to be tax havens were compelled to accept the conventional mode of 
cross-border cooperation in tax matters under which tax authorities can request bank information 
about specific taxpayers from other countries in tax evasion cases. Many important tax havens had 
long rejected this type of cooperation, often with reference to the banking secrecy rules in their 
domestic law. However, coordinated political pressure by the United States and other G20 countries, 
 
5 Mr. Weil was eventually found not guilty.  
6 For example, the IRS commissioner said at the time that “we were never interested in pursuing 52,000 accounts,” and 
that the 4,450 names gave IRS “access to the accounts we wanted” (DOJ, 2009b). 
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involving an explicit threat to impose economic sanctions on non-cooperative jurisdictions issued at 
the G20 summit held in April 2009, induced virtually every tax haven in the world to agree to the 
standard. The U.S. government signed bilateral agreements about information exchange on request 
with six tax havens, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco and Panama, during the 
period 2008-2010.  
The main limitation of these agreements is that tax authorities can only request bank 
information about specific taxpayers, and only in tax evasion cases where they possess sufficient 
evidence to assert the relevance of the information requested. In practice, the information exchange 
agreements are therefore rarely used and prominent tax experts have argued that the mode of 
cooperation is simply too weak to be an effective deterrent of offshore tax evasion (Sheppard, 2009). 
In a second step, the U.S. Congress passed a new law inducing foreign banks to provide 
information about all accounts owned by U.S. taxpayers to the U.S. tax authorities. This move from 
occasional information exchange with foreign jurisdictions under bilateral treaties to systematic 
reporting by all foreign banks represents a dramatic change in the tax enforcement efforts with respect 
to offshore accounts. The new reporting regime is detailed in the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA), which was proposed in Congress in October 2009 and signed into law by President 
Obama in March 2010. While the first reporting of foreign account information under FATCA was 
due in 2015, several years after our period of analysis, the prospect of much more comprehensive 
third-party reporting of foreign income may have induced compliance responses as early as 2009 when 
such legislation was initially being considered by legislators.  
2.3 Voluntary disclosure programs 
Complementing the initiatives aiming to facilitate detection of undeclared offshore accounts, the IRS 
also implemented a series of “voluntary disclosure” programs with incentives for offshore tax evaders 
to voluntarily declare their foreign assets.7 The first initiative of this kind was the Offshore Voluntary 
Disclosure Program, under which participants benefitted from reduced civil penalties and escaped 
criminal prosecution. The program was initiated in March 2009, and expired in October 2009. To 
apply for participation in the program, taxpayers had to submit a letter to the IRS containing 
identifying information and details about their foreign accounts or entities. Once cleared to participate, 
 
7 These initiatives are summarized and assessed in Lederman (2012). 
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the taxpayer was required to i) provide copies of previously filed original and amended returns, ii) 
submit updated complete and accurate returns for the previous six years, iii) provide information about 
previously undisclosed income, including information on financial accounts, institutions and 
facilitators, and iv) remit the necessary back taxes and penalties imposed by the OVD Program. 
Taxpayers already under investigation for tax evasion were ineligible for the program. 
A key feature of the OVD program was the uniform penalty structure under which participants 
were liable for unpaid taxes and interest for the previous six years, an “accuracy-related penalty” of 
20% of the total unpaid taxes, and an “offshore penalty” of 20% of the value of the disclosed assets.8 
As the heightened publicity of the reporting requirements for offshore accounts made many taxpayers 
aware of their FBAR filing requirement for the first time in 2009, the IRS clarified that individuals 
who had been paying all taxes due but had been unaware of their FBAR filing requirement should not 
participate in OVD and incur the offshore penalty, but rather they should simply file the delinquent 
FBARs (IRS, 2009). Subsequent to the 2009 OVD Program, the U.S. offered several other voluntary 
disclosure programs with similar terms and conditions: the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, 
in place between February and September 2011, and the 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure 
Program, in place from January 2012 onward. Each subsequent program increased the overall offshore 
penalty, and simultaneously introduced lower penalties and an easier disclosure process for less 
substantial non-compliance. We refer to this set of programs by the acronym OVD. 
The IRS reported that the first voluntary disclosure program, active from March to October 
2009, drew around 15,000 disclosures of offshore accounts and resulted in the collection of $3.4 billion 
in back taxes and penalties (IRS, 2011). As of 2014, the IRS reported 45,000 disclosures occurred 
through the voluntary disclosure programs—including later OVD programs in 2011 and 2012—
resulting in the collection of $6.5 billion in back taxes and penalties (IRS, 2014). It is important to note 
that these figures do not include what we call “quiet disclosers,” taxpayers who started reporting their 
foreign accounts in response to the increased risk of detection without participating in the OVD 
program. In addition, because the IRS figures combine taxes and penalties and pool payments relating 
to many tax years, they do not provide information about voluntary compliance via increased reporting 
 
8 The OVD penalty structure was in lieu of the usual penalty structure for a willful failure to file FBAR, which was the 
greater of $100,000 or 50 percent of the balance in the account at the time of the violation, for each violation. To ensure 
that the OVD program in fact reduced the applicable penalty, the tax authorities would compare the OVD penalties to 
the total penalties applying absent the program, and the discloser would be liable for the lower amount. The civil penalty 
for non-willful failure to file an FBAR was up to $10,000 per violation. 
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of capital income following disclosures, nor do they provide annualized information. 
3. Conceptual Framework 
We next describe the decision options faced by a potentially non-compliant taxpayer. We use this 
framework to motivate a number of empirical strategies that examine the full range of potential effects 
of the IRS enforcement initiatives. Figure 1 illustrates the decision-making process for taxpayers with 
offshore wealth, and how their behavior may change as a result of the 2008-2009 enforcement, which 
consisted of an increase in detection probabilities and an increase in the salience of the penalties for 
failure to file an FBAR. One should think of the reasoning presented here as the reduced form of a 
more complicated structural model describing each decision taxpayers make.  
We divide taxpayers with foreign bank accounts into three groups prior to the enforcement 
policy change. The first group is fully compliant with the tax law and FBAR reporting before the 
enforcement and is thus unaffected by enforcement. The second group is compliant with their tax 
obligations, but due to compliance costs or ignorance of their filing responsibilities, they did not file 
FBARs prior to 2009. Increased publicity of the requirements and non-filing penalties in 2008 may 
induce these individuals to file an FBAR. The third group consists of individuals who, prior to the 
policy change, are non-compliant with their tax obligations and also do not file an FBAR.9 Some 
members of this group might continue to risk detection and not change their behavior at all, especially 
with regard to accounts in countries where U.S. tax authorities are not yet able to obtain information 
from foreign banks. Others shift the location of accounts to less cooperative jurisdictions or change 
the structure of their foreign asset holdings to make them even harder to detect. The other possibility 
is that many of these individuals will file an FBAR and start remitting taxes due on the income in the 
accounts. Note that this type of response to enforcement could occur for high-wealth tax evaders 
deliberately concealing wealth, but also for individuals who were unintentionally non-compliant.10 
Detecting and characterizing this response is a key part of our empirical analysis. 
Individuals who decide to start complying fully must also decide whether to enter the OVD 
 
9 One can imagine a fourth group that is compliant with FBAR filing requirements but not with tax obligations. It seems 
sensible to rule this out ex ante, as admitting the existence of an account to the authorities without remitting taxes on the 
income in that account would be exceedingly risky.  
10 Many unintentional noncompliers evaded relatively little tax. The fact that some individuals with little tax due entered 
2009 OVD and were subject to the offshore penalty was the main motivation for changes to the OVD penalty structure 
introduced (and retroactively applied) for small accounts and non-willful noncompliance in later years. 
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program. Entering the OVD effectively shields individuals from criminal prosecution for tax fraud, 
but it exposes them to the substantial penalties incurred by OVD participants, as described in the 
previous section. The alternative to entering OVD is to come into compliance simply by filing the 
correct forms and reporting the correct income, without explicitly admitting any prior wrongdoing-- 
a “quiet disclosure.” Quiet disclosers would avoid the sizable OVD penalties, but they also risk 
criminal prosecution if their prior non-compliance is discovered. Quiet disclosures are therefore an 
attractive option when individuals believe that criminal prosecution in the near future is unlikely, due 
for example to their perception of limited resources of the IRS and/or the probable existence of 
larger-scale evaders the IRS might be more likely to prosecute. Finally, quiet disclosers might not file 
amended tax returns and FBARs for prior years, thus remitting no back taxes or penalties. 
Our analysis of FBAR filings, OVD participation, and income reporting will shed light 
empirically on each of the decisions described thus far. One final decision newly compliant taxpayers 
make is whether to repatriate the wealth once enforcement makes holding offshore wealth relatively 
less tax-attractive. We are limited in our ability to directly observe this type of behavior. Our estimates 
of the impact of enforcement are therefore a lower bound of the total impact including repatriation. 
4. Data 
We examine data from the IRS Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW), which provides access to a wide 
variety of tax return, enforcement, compliance, and other data. De-identified taxpayer data are 
extracted from filed tax returns, enforcement information, and narrative data that sequence taxpayer 
history (IRS, 2019). The individual returns file includes transcribed tax returns for individuals and 
includes most taxpayer-filed forms and schedules, plus third-party-filed information documents. We 
observe the information reported on Form 1040, the individual income tax return, including nearly all 
the line items on the main form and supplemental schedules, as originally filed by the taxpayer. We 
also have indicators of whether and when amended 1040 returns were filed, although we do not have 
access to line-by-line information from the amended returns. 
4.1 Foreign Bank Account Reports (FBARs) 
Crucial to our analysis is micro data from the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts. The 
official name of this form is FinCEN Form 114, where FinCEN is short for Financial Crimes 
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Enforcement Network,11 but it is generally known as the FBAR (Foreign Bank Account Report), and 
we refer to it as such.  
United States “persons” are required to file an FBAR if the person had a financial interest in 
or signature authority over at least one financial account located outside of the United States, and the 
aggregate value of all foreign financial accounts exceeded $10,000 at any time during the calendar year 
reported. As defined by the instructions to the FBAR, a United States person includes “U.S. citizens; 
U.S. residents; entities, including but not limited to, corporations, partnerships, or limited liability 
companies, created or organized in the United States or under the laws of the United States; and trusts 
or estates formed under the laws of the United States.” Extensive rules are designed to ensure that 
individuals cannot avoid an FBAR filing requirement for assets they own by holding them indirectly, 
for example through a shell corporation in a foreign country. Indirectly-held financial assets are subject 
to FBAR reporting rules, and are within the purview of the enforcement crackdown.12 
The FBAR is a calendar-year report that during the period of our analysis had to be filed on 
or before June 30 of the year following the calendar year being reported. Effective July 1, 2013, the 
FBAR must be filed electronically and, as of 2017, the filing date is April 15. The FBAR is filed, 
separately from federal tax returns, with FinCEN, which is a distinct agency from the IRS.13 Unlike 
the filing of federal tax returns, there is no provision for requesting an extension of time to file an 
FBAR. The filer of an FBAR is required to report account numbers and identifying information for 
the U.S. person who owns the assets in the account (directly or indirectly), including an address and 
the maximum value of each account for the year. Prior to 2009, filers were required to report the 
account value within various ranges, but beginning in 2009 they were required to report the exact 
maximum dollar amount. 
4.2 Voluntary disclosure   
The final component of our analysis in this paper relies on data regarding participation in the offshore 
voluntary disclosure programs (the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs/Initiatives of 2009, 
 
11 Our data include the earlier version of this form, TD Form 90-22.1, which has been required since the Banking 
Secrecy Act of 1970, and which was superseded as of September 30, 2013 by FinCEN Form 114 (FBAR). 
12 In some cases, individuals may hold assets through networks of accounts, trusts. and corporations in multiple 
countries. The FBAR filing requirements essentially require that each account that an individual owns directly or 
indirectly and in any country be reported individually on the FBAR. 
13 IRS obtains data on FBARs from FinCEN; like many enforcement procedures, the exact way in which the IRS uses 
FBARs for tax enforcement is not publicly known. 
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2011, and 2012, all referred to here as OVD). Our data on the voluntary disclosure programs consist 
of whether an individual participated in one of the voluntary disclosure programs, the date that an IRS 
official recorded receiving their application to participate in the program, and the opening and closing 
dates for the case. We use the first of these dates to determine when an individual participated in the 
OVD program. In some cases, processing delays could cause the date of receipt of an application to 
be after the actual submission of the application, and the opening date of the case can be later still, 
which is important to bear in mind when considering some of the results regarding the timing of OVD 
participation and the associated income reporting. 
5. Aggregate Data Analysis 
5.1 Total FBAR and OVD filings 
In this section, we present evidence suggesting that the enforcement efforts in 2009 were associated 
with a sizable increase in tax compliance. In particular, we use information on filings of FBARs and 
enrollment into the OVD programs to document a sharp increase in disclosures of foreign wealth in 
2009 and to show that the increase in disclosures was much stronger for the types of foreign accounts 
that are a priori most likely to be used for tax evasion.  
Figure 2 shows the number of individuals filing an FBAR (left axis) and the number of 
individuals participating in the OVD programs (right axis) in each year over the period 2001-2011. 
The number of FBAR filers grew from 131,000 filers in 2001 to around 402,000 filers in 2011. There 
is a noticeable jump in the number of FBAR filers between 2004 and 2005, which is plausibly due to 
the introduction in 2004 of a penalty for non-willful failure to file an FBAR, and a much larger jump 
in 2009 coinciding with the enforcement efforts. There were around 15,000 OVD participants in both 
2009 and 2011; the two years in the sample period where a voluntary disclosure program was in place. 
The fact that we record a positive number of OVD participants in 2010 is attributable to the 
processing delays mentioned in Section 4.2. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on FBAR filers and their foreign accounts in 2008 and 
2009, highlighting several important properties of the sample. First, recall that all U.S. taxpayers with 
accounts greater than the threshold size held outside of the U.S. are required to file FBARs, whether 
they reside in the U.S. or not. Approximately one-third of the FBAR filers were residing outside of 
the U.S. as indicated by the address reported on the FBAR. We expect that, conditional on having a 
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foreign account, the probability of using the account to evade U.S. income taxes is higher among 
individuals living in the U.S. than among individuals living in foreign countries, simply because the 
latter have a clear transaction motive for holding an account in the country where they live. Second, 
in 2008 about one-sixth of the FBAR filers reported at least one account in a tax haven, which we 
define in this paper as the OECD (2000) list of uncooperative tax havens14 plus Switzerland, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Luxembourg. When a taxpayer discloses a tax haven account, this is 
arguably more likely to represent an increase in compliance because tax haven accounts are known to 
be largely undeclared for tax purposes (Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, 2019). Third, a small 
fraction of FBAR filers (1% in 2008) amends FBARs for previous years. Although there may be cases 
where taxpayers discover non-deliberate errors on previous years’ FBARs and choose to correct them, 
the filing of amended returns is generally a strong indication of new compliance. Finally, the table 
shows that many FBAR filers have multiple accounts (59% in 2008 and 65% in 2009), so that the 
number of reported accounts is almost three times as large as the number of filers in 2008 and almost 
four times as large in 2009. As of 2008, most reported accounts were located in Europe (45%), North 
America (28%) and Asia (24%) and most disclosed accounts are relatively small, with values between 
$10,000 and $100,000 being the most frequent range. The analysis below will devote considerable 
attention to the change in the nature of FBAR reports around the time of the enforcement efforts. 
5.2 New disclosers of foreign accounts 
To detect the effect on tax compliance of the enforcement efforts that began in earnest in 2009, we 
construct an annual measure of new disclosers of foreign accounts. For three reasons, the aggregate 
number of FBAR and OVD filings reported in Figure 2 do not directly measure this concept. First, 
the series do not distinguish between new and continuous FBAR filers. Second, the aggregate FBAR 
series includes taxpayers living outside of the U.S. for whom a non-U.S. account is most often not a 
“foreign” account but rather is an account in their country of residence, in part to facilitate local 
transactions. Third, while OVD participants represent new disclosures by definition, they may or may 
not be included in the number of FBAR filers in the year they apply to participate in the OVD; 
depending on the precise timing of the application and the processing time at the IRS, the disclosed 
assets may be recorded on an FBAR for the first time in the application year or in a later year.  
 
14 The OECD list of tax havens can be found on page 17 of the 2000 progress report found at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/2090192.pdf 
 15 
To address these issues, we construct a measure of “new disclosers” of foreign accounts, 
which comprises two distinct groups: “OVD filers” in year t who are counted in the year they file an 
OVD application regardless of their FBAR filings; and “first-time FBAR filers” in year t, defined as 
tax payers that file an FBAR in year t and did not file an FBAR in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. To avoid 
double counting, the latter group excludes taxpayers who participated in an OVD at any time during 
the sample period and taxpayers with non-U.S. addresses.   
Figure 3 reports statistics on these groups of new disclosers over the period 2005-2011. Figure 
3.A. shows that the annual number of new disclosers hovered at about 40,000 individuals in each of 
the years from 2005 to 2008, and then surged to around 90,000 individuals in 2009. The increase of 
about 50,000 contains about 15,000 OVD participants, but mostly reflects individuals who file a new 
FBAR outside of the OVD program. There was another surge in first-time FBAR filing in 2011 
coinciding with the second OVD program, but again the majority of new filers did so outside of the 
OVD program. 
Figure 3.B shows the aggregate value of the accounts reported by the new disclosers.15 The 
value was between $20 and $28 billion in the years 2005-2008 with a slightly increasing trend after 
2006, but in 2009 jumped by a factor of over four and a half to $135 billion, and then returned to $40 
billion in 2010. These data patterns suggest that the enforcement policies in 2008-2009 had a 
significant effect on new disclosers of foreign accounts. Simple difference estimates suggest that the 
policies induced around 50,000 taxpayers to disclose accounts with a total value of around $100 billion, 
with three-quarters of the response occurring in the form of quiet disclosures outside of the OVD 
program.  
5.3 The characteristics of newly disclosed accounts 
The spectacular surge in the number of taxpayers who filed an FBAR for the first time in 2009 without 
 
15 There are a number of measurement issues. First, prior to 2009, FBAR filers were not required to report exact account 
values, but were asked to choose between four value ranges: below $10,000, between $10,000 and $100,000, between 
$100,000 and $1 million, and above $1 million. We impute aggregate values before 2009 by assuming that the (unobserved) 
distribution of values within each range was the same as the (observed) distribution in 2009. Second, on a few FBARs, 
reported account values are so extremely large that they almost certainly reflect typing errors. For instance, in a number of 
observations the FBAR account value was concatenated with the account number from the next line, so that the FBAR 
account value appeared to be in the trillions of dollars. We address this issue by trimming account values at $1 billion. 
Third, our OVD dataset does not contain information on the precise value of the disclosed assets. For OVD filers in year 
t, we approximate this with the aggregate value of the accounts reported on the FBAR in year t (or in year t+1 if no FBAR 
is filed in year t) minus the value of the accounts reported in year t-1 (if any). This procedure is reasonable given that OVD 
participants were required to file delinquent FBARs. 
 16 
participating in the OVD initiatives suggests that the enforcement efforts induced a significant number 
of quiet disclosures of foreign accounts previously used for tax evasion. To further probe this 
interpretation, we describe the heterogeneity of the surge along two dimensions, account country and 
account value. Throughout we exclude OVD participants, to focus on potential quiet disclosers. 
First, in Figure 4, we plot the increase in the number of new filers in 2009 along two 
dimensions: whether or not the FBAR filer reported a U.S. address on their FBAR, and whether or 
not the filer disclosed an account located in a tax haven according to our definition. If the primary 
cause of increased disclosures by U.S. filers in 2009 depicted in Figure 3 was not enforcement but, 
rather, coincident shocks affecting both U.S. and non-U.S. residents—e.g. the economic turbulence 
of 2009—we should observe similar trends in first-time FBAR filers among the two groups. 
Even among filers with U.S. addresses, we might expect some people to hold a foreign account 
for legitimate reasons. Moreover, filers not holding an account explicitly for evasion might be affected 
by enforcement, especially the increased salience of FBAR reporting requirements in 2009, so it is 
useful to know whether the increase in new filers in 2009 could be entirely due to filers who are not 
deliberately evading taxes.  We cannot directly observe whether an account is held for evasive purposes 
or not; instead, we split the sample by whether or not new filers disclosed an account in tax havens to 
help us assess this issue. 
The results in Figure 4 suggest that a large portion of new disclosures were previously evasive 
accounts. The four series plotted in the Figure all have very similar trends in the period 2005-2008, 
but diverge sharply in 2009. We observe a 65% increase for filers with U.S. addresses and no haven 
accounts, and a 200% increase for filers with U.S. addresses and haven accounts. In contrast, we 
observe little change in the number of disclosures by filers with non-U.S. addresses—whether or not 
they have haven accounts. The stark increase in disclosures of tax haven accounts for filers with U.S. 
addresses suggests that a significant fraction of the new FBAR filers were previously evading taxes 
through their foreign accounts. Motivated by this result, the remainder of this analysis excludes 
taxpayers reporting an address outside of the U.S. (whose non-U.S. accounts are less likely to be used 
for tax evasion purposes), in order to focus more precisely on potential quiet disclosers. 
Second, in Figure 5, we further highlight the difference between FBAR reporting in tax havens 
(red bars) and non-havens (blue bars) by displaying the percent change from 2008 to 2009 in the 
number of first-time FBAR filers reporting accounts in individual countries. Individuals with accounts 
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in multiple countries are counted multiple times, once for each country in which they have an account. 
Clearly, increases were disproportionately concentrated in havens. For example, the number of new 
FBAR filers disclosing an account in the notorious tax haven of the Cayman Islands increased by more 
than 4,000 filers from 2008 to 2009, for an increase of over 1000%! 
Third, in Figure 6, we show the number of new FBAR filers within account size categories. 
Individuals with multiple foreign accounts are placed into a category based on their largest reported 
account. The increases in 2009 were larger for those reporting larger accounts, which are more likely 
to serve wealth storage purposes, and much more modest for smaller account sizes (below $100,000), 
which are more likely to be transactional accounts. The largest relative surge was among those 
reporting accounts over $1 million. In sum, by showing that the surge in first-time FBAR filings in 
2009 was particularly pronounced for accounts that were more likely used to evade taxes, accounts in 
tax havens and accounts with large balances, Figures 4-6 constitute further evidence of a surge in quiet 
disclosures at the time of the enforcement initiatives.  
 Online appendix Figure A.1 reports one additional piece of evidence of the number of quiet 
disclosures in 2009, relating to the decision to file amended FBARs to correct prior non-compliance. 
In Figure A.1, we show the number of new disclosers who filed amended and non-amended FBARs 
without participating in the OVD program. The number of filers with amended FBARs was relatively 
constant over the period 2005-2008, but increased by 600% in 2009. In absolute terms, however, the 
increase was modest, from around 1,000 amendments pre-2009 to around 7,000 amendments in 2009. 
This suggests that most of the taxpayers disclosing quietly in 2009, estimated at around 35,000 in 
Section 5.2, did not at the same time amend their FBARs for previous years.  
5.4 The intensive margin of disclosure 
The analysis to this point has focused on disclosures on the extensive margin of FBAR reporting: 
individuals who did not report their foreign accounts before 2008, but started reporting in 2009, 
apparently in response to enforcement. Next, we investigate whether there are also quiet disclosures 
on the intensive margin: individuals who reported some foreign accounts before 2008 (for instance, 
small accounts in non-havens serving transactional purposes), but in 2009 started reporting additional 
accounts (for instance, large accounts in havens serving wealth storage purposes).  
To explore this behavioral response, we define three indicators of potential quiet disclosers 
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among taxpayers who did not participate in the OVD program: (i) FBAR filers who reported exactly 
one account in year t-1 and at least two accounts in year t (“new multiple account holders”); (ii) FBAR 
filers who reported only accounts below $100,000 in year t-1 and at least one account above $1 million 
in year t (“new large accounts”); and (iii) FBAR filers who reported only non-haven account(s) in year 
t-1 and at least one haven account in year t (“new haven account holders”). Figure 7 shows only slightly 
increasing trends from 2005 to 2008, followed by sharp increases in 2009 for all three groups: new 
multiple accounts increased by 63%; new haven accounts increased 70%; and new large accounts 
increased by 160%. These patterns are clearly consistent with a large increase in quiet disclosures in 
2009 on the intensive margin. 
5.5 The decision to participate in the OVD Program, conditional on disclosure 
For a taxpayer who decides that continued evasion is too risky in the new post-2009 enforcement 
environment, the decision to disclose quietly or participate in the OVD should weigh the risks and 
penalties associated with each option. As discussed in Section 3, OVD effectively eliminates the risk 
of criminal prosecution and the harshest possible penalties, but it also subjects the taxpayer to the 
OVD’s reduced offshore penalty with certainty in addition to back taxes. Theory therefore suggests 
that the accounts with the highest probability of prosecution conditional on quiet disclosure should 
be the ones in which taxpayers participate in OVD. We hypothesize that, relative to quiet disclosure, 
OVD participation is more likely to be attractive for the largest accounts, and for accounts in locations 
where the enforcement crackdown was especially strong, most notably Switzerland. 
In order to compare quiet disclosers to OVD participants, it is useful to have a more refined 
way to estimate the characteristics of FBARs filed in response to enforcement, as not all new FBAR 
filers in 2009 were induced by enforcement, and the above analysis suggests that the characteristics of 
quiet disclosers may differ from that of other new FBAR filers in 2009. To do this, we assume that in 
the counterfactual where the 2009 crackdown did not occur, 1) the overall number of new filers and 
2) the distribution of characteristics of new filers would have been the same in 2009 as in the actual 
population of new filers in 2008.16 We label individuals who filed because of the enforcement 
crackdown in 2009 “FBAR compliers.”17 By the first assumption above, we calculate the number of 
 
16 We observe from Figures 3, 4, and 6 that the number and characteristics of new FBARs filed was relatively stable 
from 2005 to 2008, which suggests that these assumptions are correct up to a reasonable approximation. 
17 We use this term to distinguish between all new filers in 2009 and the subset that were induced to file by the enforcement 
initiatives. The latter may include some “FBAR-only” compliers, who had been reporting income and remitting taxes 
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FBAR compliers as the simple difference between the number of new FBAR filers in 2008 and 2009. 
By the second assumption, we compute the probability of some characteristic occurring among FBAR 
compliers as the change in new FBAR filers with the characteristic scaled by the number of FBAR 
compliers.18 
In Figure 8, we show how account characteristics vary across quiet and non-quiet disclosures. 
Panel A shows that FBAR compliers had significantly higher account values than new FBAR filers 
overall, but also that the OVD participants had still larger account values. This finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis that OVD participants should have larger account values than FBAR compliers, 
as larger account values are associated with a larger probability of detection. Panel B shows that around 
45% of OVD participants disclosed a Swiss account, compared to less than 10% of FBAR compliers. 
In sharp contrast, over 10% of FBAR compliers disclosed an account in the Cayman Islands, 
compared to a negligible share of OVD participants. As the enforcement efforts in 2009 targeted 
accounts in Switzerland, but not those in the Cayman Islands, the patterns are consistent with our 
hypothesis about the role of prosecution risk in shaping the mode of disclosure. Figure 8.B suggests 
that, although they are less important overall, OVD disclosures were much more concentrated in 
Liechtenstein and Luxembourg than quiet disclosures. Tax evaders may have perceived these countries 
as risky as they both signed information exchange treaties with the U.S. in 2008 and Lichtenstein was 
home to the first leak of customer data from an offshore bank in the same year (Johannesen and 
Stolper, 2017). 
6. The Response of Reported Capital Income 
To this point, we have focused on the impact of the enforcement initiatives on reported foreign 
accounts. Of more direct tax policy interest is the effect of enforcement on income reported, and 
subjected to tax, on U.S. tax returns. It is conceivable, although inconsistent with evidence above, that 
our results to this point could be obtained without an increase in income tax compliance, if individuals 
filing new FBARs had been paying tax on the income in those accounts but failing to declare them on 
 
correctly all along. Regardless of whether they are engaging in a true quiet disclosure, these taxpayers are newly compliant 
with the FBAR filing rule, and they are compliers in the sense of the Imbens and Angrist (1994) treatment effects 
framework.  
18 For example, suppose the overall number of new filers increases from 40,000 to 90,000 from 2008 to 2009—an 
increase of 50,000. Suppose further that among filers with accounts in some haven country C, disclosures increased from 
4,000 in 2008 to 14,000 in 2009—an increase of 10,000. Our assumptions would imply that of the 50,000 FBAR 
compliers, 10,000, or 20% of all FBAR compliers, disclosed an account in C. 
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an FBAR. In this section, we analyze capital income reporting behavior, by linking individuals’ income 
tax returns with their FBAR reports and information on OVD participation. 
We examine whether the disclosure of an account was associated with increased reported 
financial capital income for two groups of disclosers: OVD participants and first-time FBAR filers 
with U.S. addresses outside the OVD program. To remove confounding trends due to the business 
cycle, we difference reported income in this group against a comparison group, who owned offshore 
wealth but were compliant before the enforcement crackdown. Specifically, our comparison group 
consists of individuals that filed FBARs continuously from 2006 to 2009 and reported the same 
number of accounts on their FBARs in each of these years. The latter restriction helps purge the 
comparison group of intensive margin compliers of the type discussed in Section 5.4.19 
We analyze data on reported incomes for these groups for four years before and four years 
after each group’s initial disclosure of an offshore account in 2009. Specifically, we estimate a flexible 
difference-in-differences (DD) model of the form 
!(#$%) = ( + * +,-$%,.,/0.,,203 + 4$ + 5% ∗ 7898:;$ + <$%	,									(1) 
where -$%,  are event-time dummies equal to 1 when an individual is observed in the disclosure group 
in year ?; ?=0 is the year of disclosure. We estimate the same specification separately for OVD 
participants and other first-time FBAR filer group; the comparison group is the same throughout. Our 
specification also includes individual fixed effects, 4$ , and year fixed effects, 5%, interacted with age 
groups. The interaction of year fixed effects with age groups helps to control for life-cycle wealth 
accumulation and career paths.20 The coefficient +, represents the change in income from the year 
before disclosure, s=-1, to year ?. Under the assumption that aggregate shocks to the various age 
groups affect the disclosure and comparison groups in the same way before and after the event, we 
can interpret +, as the change in income attributable to new disclosures of offshore accounts. We 
examine various sources of income as the outcome #$%; we expect to observe impacts for capital 
income flows specifically. To accommodate zeros and, in some cases, negative values (due to capital 
 
19 Removing the latter restriction from the comparison group yields very similar results. The point estimates of interest 
are slightly smaller if we remove the restriction on the number of accounts being reported by continuous filers, which is 
consistent with the presence of increased tax compliance among some continuous FBAR filers. 
20 Age groups are defined as of year 2010 and are 25-40 years, 41-50 years, 51-60 years, and 61-80 years. 
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losses) of the dependent variable, we use an inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation. For positive 
ranges of #$%, the coefficients of the event-time dummies can be interpreted exactly like a log 
specification. Interpreting the results in the presence of an effect on the propensity to report zero 
capital income is more complicated. Nonetheless, we prefer the IHS transformation because we 
believe it is more appropriate to assume that the underlying trends are parallel in approximately 
logarithmic terms, but  we do not wish to exclude zeros, as doing so can introduce bias and, as we 
show in Online Appendix Figures A.2 and A.3, individuals reporting zero in the pre-disclosure period 
are apparently an important part of the effects of the policy.21 
Table 2 presents statistics on the incomes of individuals in the two disclosure groups and the 
comparison group in the year before their disclosure of an offshore account (s = -1 in equation (1)). 
These individuals have very high incomes compared to the rest of the U.S. tax filing population, 
although they do not all have the extremely high level of income some popular characterizations of 
offshore account holders might suggest. About 60% of either OVD participants or new FBAR filers 
are in the top 10% of the income distribution. Median annual income (as measured by adjusted gross 
income) is about $160,000 in each group. However, at the top of the income distribution in both 
disclosure groups we examine, there are some very high-income individuals. The 90th percentile of 
income is almost $1.25 million among OVD participants and $885,000 for other new FBAR filers, an 
income level that puts all of these individuals in the top 0.5% of the overall U.S. income distribution 
by a considerable margin. 
6.1 Reported income response of OVD participants 
To establish the validity of our DD method, as well as to learn about the reported income responses 
of admitted non-compliers upon the time of disclosing an account, we first apply this method to 2009 
OVD participants. Figure 9 plots estimated coefficients on the event time dummies and corresponding 
95% confidence intervals for various income sources (Table A.1 reports the regression coefficients). 
The first panel shows results for reported interest income, dividend income and capital gains. OVD 
participants and the comparison group exhibit very similar trends in all three outcomes in pre-
disclosure years but diverge sharply following disclosure. For interest income, we observe a coefficient 
 
21 Using instead a traditional log transformation and simply dropping zero and negative observations gives similar results 
(see, e.g., Table A.2).  
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of 1.06 for event time 1 corresponding to an increase of approximately 189%.22 The corresponding 
estimates are 0.49 (63%) for dividend income and 0.21 (23%) for capital gains. The second panel 
shows the results for total financial capital income, which combines interest, dividends, and capital 
gains. We observe a coefficient in event year 1 of 0.75 (112%).23  
These patterns indicate, unsurprisingly, that disclosures through the OVD program were 
associated with large increases in financial capital income reporting. We return to these estimates 
below when we estimate the compliance effect of the enforcement initiatives in terms of reported 
taxable income and tax revenue. Additionally, we find an increased propensity to report any capital 
income at the time of disclosure. By estimating Eq. (1) using a binary dependent variable indicating 
whether the individual reported any positive capital income as the outcome, we find a 2.9 percentage 
point increase in the probability of reporting any positive capital income (see Figure A.2.B).  
6.2 Reported income response of other 2009 first-time FBAR filers  
We now turn to the group of individuals that we suspect contains a large number of previously non-
compliant individuals: first-time FBAR filers with U.S. addresses who did not participate in an OVD 
program. We therefore compare the qualitative and quantitative patterns observed in Figure 9 with 
the income reporting patterns around first-time FBAR filing, defined in exactly the same way as in the 
previous subsection.  
Figure 10 plots the coefficients and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the event 
study of various types of income for first-time FBAR filers. Online Appendix Table A.3 shows the 
estimated coefficients. In most respects, the patterns are very similar to those observed for OVD 
participants, with large increases in reported capital income at the time of first-time FBAR filing and 
virtually no changes in other types of income. The magnitudes of the estimated percentage change for 
capital income components are slightly smaller compared to the OVD group, but surprisingly similar 
given that the increases seen for voluntary disclosure program participants consist entirely of admitted 
non-compliers, and the group of first-time filers admitted no non-compliance and likely contains 
 
22 This approximation is the exponential of the coefficient minus 1. We use this approximation because the IHS 
transform approximates the log transformation for positive values of the outcome variable. Refer to the discussion of 
equation (1)) for more details. 
23 We show in the online appendix Figure A.2 that repeating this exercise for wage and salary income, income from sole-
proprietorships (1040 Schedule C) and income from pass-through businesses (1040 Schedule E) reveals no differential 
income reporting following disclosure. 
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people who were previously compliant. The estimated coefficient in event year 1 is 0.62 (86%) for 
interest income, 0.20 (22%) for dividend income and 0.10 (10%) for capital gains income. These are 
all at least 50% of the estimated increase for voluntary disclosure program participants. We estimate a 
coefficient in event year 1 of 0.49 (63%) for total financial capital income. A larger amount of the 
response in total financial capital income in this group comes from the extensive margin: we estimate 
a 4.2 percentage point increase in the probability of reporting any positive financial capital income. 24 
Because only a subset of this group filed an FBAR because of enforcement, we interpret the 
effects presented in Figure 10 and Table A.3 as the reduced form estimates of a two-stage model like 
the instrumental variables model of Imbens and Angrist (2004). In the first stage, enforcement induces 
disclosures of a set of compliers to file FBAR (see Section 5.6). In the second stage, enforcement-
driven disclosures lead to increased reported income. The exclusion restriction here requires that 
income does not jump when a legitimate first-time FBAR filer discloses an account. In this case, we 
can estimate the effect of disclosure on reported income of compliers by scaling the estimates in Figure 
10 by the fraction of the 2009 first-time FBAR filers who were compliers, just as one divides a reduced-
form estimate by the first-stage estimate to obtain a local average treatment effect. From Figure 3.A, 
we concluded that roughly 50 percent of the approximately 75,000 first-time FBAR filers in 2009 were 
compliers who disclosed because of enforcement. The exact estimate based on a simple difference 
from 2008 to 2009 is 46 percent. The estimate of the effect of enforcement on the compliers for each 
type of income would therefore be around twice as large as the estimates depicted in Figure 10 and 
reported in Table A.3—the implied point estimate for total financial capital income in event year 1 is 
1.05. This effect is similar to, but slightly larger than, the comparable estimate for OVD filers.25 
With respect to the validity of the research design we observe that, unlike with the OVD 
participants, there are slightly increasing trends in the pre-disclosure period for interest and dividend 
income. This is not entirely surprising, given that some portion of first-time FBAR filers will be 
legitimately opening new accounts. We might thus expect that the timing of the first filing contains 
information about the income path prior to filing. Nevertheless, we see a large, sharp jump in capital 
 
24 We also find little to no estimated change in wages and salary income or income of sole proprietorships and other forms 
of pass-through business income as reported on 1040 Schedules C and E, respectively. The results for these income 
sources and for the probability of reporting positive capital income can be found in the online appendix Figure A.3. 
25 An alternate estimate in Online Appendix Table A.9, puts the fraction of quiet disclosers that are compliers at 62 
percent. Scaling by this number instead gives an estimate for total income of 0.79, which is very close to that of the 
OVD sample.  
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income at first-time filing, which is a clear break from trend for each type of capital income. The size 
of this jump suggests that the magnitude of the bias from slightly divergent pre-trends is likely small. 
We next provide further evidence that the increases in reported income accompanying account 
disclosures did indeed result from disclosures of foreign accounts and not some confounding source. 
To do so, we leverage the fact that interest and dividend income from assets held in the US are already 
subject to third party information reporting from US financial institutions. Forms 1099-INT and 1099-
DIV report the amount of interest and dividend income accruing to taxpayers in their US accounts. 
We therefore decompose total reported interest and dividend income from the individual’s tax return 
into income reported by US financial institutions, and income reported by the taxpayer but not 
reported by domestic financial institutions. For both interest and dividends, we calculate the total 
domestic income as the sum of the Form 1099 income received by the taxpayer (including that of the 
taxpayer’s spouse for married taxpayers filing jointly), and we impute reported income from foreign 
sources as the difference between the total income reported by the taxpayer and the domestic income 
reported on 1099 forms.26 We then estimate our event study specification on each type of income 
separately. We do not analyze capital gains here, as directly held capital gains and losses in domestic 
accounts were not subject to complete information reporting until 2011, and even then only for assets 
acquired after January 1, 2011. Figure 11 depicts the results, with the point estimates reported in Table 
A.5. In Figures 11.A and 11.B we observe that the estimated effects on overall reported interest and 
dividend income are disproportionately driven by income not appearing on Form 1099 domestic 
information reports, and are thus almost certainly driven by reporting of foreign accounts.  
We investigate one additional margin of response to enforcement: the extent to which 
individuals amended earlier income tax returns to report previously unreported income, without 
participating in an OVD program or paying the associated penalties. Studying amended returns 
provides evidence about a margin of response quiet disclosers may consider, and it provides strong 
evidence on the existence of quiet disclosure responses, as there is no other reason we should expect 
an increase in amended returns upon filing a new FBAR. We estimate a linear probability model like  
Eq. (1), with an indicator for filing an amended tax return for one of the last four years in year t as the 
outcome (see Online Appendix Figure A.5). We estimate no differential pre-trend. Filers are 3.3 
 
26 Adding income from pass-through entities reported on Schedule K-1’s to the 1099 income for our concept of third-
party reported income has little effect on the results. Relatedly, it is unlikely that the $10 minimum for issuance of a 
domestic 1099 form for interest or dividend income affects the results. 
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percentage points more likely to submit an amended tax return when they file a new FBAR, relative 
to the comparison group. This represents a doubling of the rate of filing an amended tax return: the 
rate of amendment in the reference period (t-1) is 3 percent. This result suggests that almost 50% of 
individuals filing amended tax returns when they file a new FBAR are quiet disclosers. 
6.3 The total effect of enforcement 
In this section, we use the event study results above to estimate the implied effect on total reported 
capital income and tax revenues for OVD participants and first-time FBAR filers.27 We use two related 
methods of estimating the total effects and ultimately present a range of estimates for the effect of the 
enforcement initiatives on capital income reporting and revenue collections.28 
6.3.1 Direct method 
What we call the “direct method” of estimating the total effect of enforcement uses the average effects 
from the results in Section 6.1 and 6.2 to estimate the change in total reported capital income for 
OVD participants and first-time filers. Specifically, we assume a uniform effect of disclosure in IHS 
terms to impute a counterfactual reported capital income in year t+1 for each individual in the 
disclosure group. The counterfactual of total reported income, @AB, is calculated as 	@AB =∑ !03(!(#$) − +E),$  where !() is the IHS transformation, #$ is reported income of individual F in 
the disclosure group in year t+1, and +E is the t+1 estimated coefficient from the event study for 
income source #. We estimate the total change in reported income attributable to enforcement as the 
difference between total income actually reported and the counterfactual total.  To facilitate the 
analysis of tax revenues, we estimate total effects separately for interest, dividends, and capital gains; 
the results are similar if we apply the method to total financial capital income. 
The top row of each of the three panels of Table 3 shows the results from this method; details 
of the calculation can be found in the online appendix Table A.7. For OVD participants, we estimate 
a change in total reported capital income of almost $700 million. For first-time filers, our estimate is 
about $3.5 billion. Assuming non-qualified dividends and short-term capital gains are negligible, so 
that all dividends and capital gains are taxed at a top marginal tax rate of 15 percent, our calculation 
 
27 Our measure of the total effect on tax revenue does not account for some ways in which taxpayers might change other 
income tax reporting to offset the impact on their tax liability of reporting additional income, as in Slemrod et al (2017). 
Our results suggest that some forms of offsetting, such as reduced reporting of business income, are uncommon.  
28 Our revenue estimates only account for federal income taxes and not for income taxes imposed in some U.S. states. 
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suggests that OVD participants incurred $184 million more in taxes due to their disclosure of offshore 
wealth, while other first-time FBAR filers owed $1 billion more in taxes.29  
6.3.2 Indirect method 
In this section we discuss potential bias in the previous approach and implement a complementary, 
indirect approach. We model the change in reported capital income accompanying a disclosure as G#$ = H$:$I$,  (2) 
where G#$ is the change in reported income (in dollars), H$ equals one if the individual was non-
compliant prior to disclosure and zero otherwise, :$ is the taxable rate of return (excluding unrealized 
capital gains), and I$ is the newly reported account value. Dividing by a baseline (non-zero) value #$,%03 yields 
JEKEK,LMN = H$:$ OKEK,LMN .  (3) 
In Figure A.6, we show that in our data the ratio I$/#$,%03 is decreasing in #$,%03. Assuming 
homogeneous effects in our direct method therefore imposes an effect that is too large at the top of 
the income distribution and too small at the bottom. As the capital income distribution has a thick 
top tail (Piketty, 2013), using an approach that overestimates the effect at the top likely over-estimates 
the total effect. The first key assumption of our indirect approach is that the ratio I$/#$,%03	does not 
co-vary with H$:$ , i.e. QRS(H$:$, I$/#$) = 0.	 Taking expectations of Eq. (3) and applying this 
assumption, we have 
V[H$:$] = Y[ZEK/EK,LMN,]Y[OK/EK,LMN]	 . (4) 
We estimate the numerator of the right-hand side of Eq. (4) in the regressions in Section 6.1 and 6.2, 
and we estimate the denominator directly.30 We can thereby estimate V[H$:$], which we will call the 
compliance-adjusted rate of return, separately for OVD participants and first-time FBAR filers. Our second 
 
29 Note that these tax liabilities are calculated for a single year following disclosure of an offshore account. These figures 
do not include any back taxes or penalties that are paid by the taxpayer as a result of disclosure. The total effect we estimate 
is thus the annual forward-looking effect from voluntary tax compliance not counting the penalty components of the 
payments made during participation in the OVD program or amending of tax returns.  
 
30 When calculating statistics for the ratio I$/#$	, we exclude observations with zero or negative #$,	and, due to the extreme 
skew of the distribution from observations with a very small denominator, we trim the distribution at its 95th percentile. 
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key assumption is that H$:$ does not vary by offshore wealth: QRS(H$:$, I$) = 0. Under this 
assumption we can apply the estimates of V[H$:$] to estimate the total change in income reporting 
(the sum of G#$	 using Eq. (2)). Most plausible ways in which our two zero-covariance assumptions 
would fail—e.g. if those with larger accounts or higher income earn higher rates of return (Piketty, 
2013) or are more likely to be ex ante noncompliant—imply that this method gives a lower bound on 
the total effect. 
The results of this approach are summarized in the second row of each panel of Table 3—see 
Table A.8 for details. This method yields an estimate of a change in reported capital income of 
approximately $450 million for OVD participants and $1.5 billion for first-time filers. These estimates 
of the total effect of enforcement are smaller than what we obtain from the direct method. This is 
consistent with the intuition discussed above that the direct and indirect approaches are likely to 
provide upper and lower bounds on the total effect, respectively.  
Finally, we note that estimates from the direct and indirect methods imply sensible values for 
the rates of return. As reported in Table 3, with details provided in Tables A.7-A.9, the compliance-
adjusted rates of return we estimate, in the range of 1 to 3 percent, are reassuringly reasonable. Our 
estimates reflect increases in taxable income and are therefore not immediately comparable to market 
returns. First, to the extent that some new FBAR filers were fully tax compliant, their compliance-
adjusted return was zero. Second, to the extent that quiet disclosers did not realize capital gains or 
adopted the well-known avoidance strategy of selling stocks with latent losses and keeping stocks with 
latent gains (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), capital gains do not enter our estimates.31 
7. Conclusion 
We find that enforcement initiatives on the taxation of offshore wealth increased the number 
of individuals reporting foreign accounts to the IRS by around 50,000 taxpayers and increased the 
total amount of wealth disclosed by about $100 billion. Most of this response occurred outside of the 
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure programs. Even outside the OVD programs, newly disclosed accounts 
were disproportionately concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Overall patterns 
of response suggest that the increase in foreign account reporting reflected an increase in tax 
 
31 Market returns in 2009 indeed consisted largely of capital gains: interest rates were generally low (e.g. 0.1% return on a 
3-month bill) and while stock market returns were high (e.g. 25% return on S&P 500), only a small fraction was dividends 
(e.g. 2.5% on S&P 500). 
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compliance. 
The reporting of new foreign accounts coincided with substantial increases in financial capital 
income flows reported on tax returns, even for those who never participated in a voluntary disclosure 
program. Our results suggest that a number of individuals made quiet disclosures to avoid the 
significant penalties that would be otherwise be due under the voluntary disclosure program.  In total, 
we estimate that enforcement efforts led individuals to report $2 to $4 billion annually in total financial 
capital income, which corresponds to an increase in tax revenues of $570 million to $1.25 billion 
annually. On the whole, these results imply that the increase in tax compliance induced by this set of 
policy initiatives was significantly larger than suggested by official statistics based solely on backward-
looking information about tax and penalty payments made under the voluntary disclosure programs 
(e.g. IRS, 2014). 
Our estimated total effect of enforcement is sizable, but small relative to independent 
estimates of the amount of concealed offshore wealth and capital income overall (Zucman, 2013; 
Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, 2018). An increase of $100 billion in disclosed wealth would 
constitute 10% of total US-owned offshore wealth as estimated in prior work.32 Significant non-
compliance likely remained after the enforcement initiatives studied in this paper were implemented. 
However, the policy regime in the period we study was one of targeted enforcement. Further research 
should examine the subsequent, more comprehensive enforcement efforts undertaken by the U.S. and 
other countries, and also account for the compliance costs of these policies. 
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Figure  1. Decision-Making over Tax Compliance with Foreign Assets and the 2008-2009 Enforcement 
Initiatives  
  
Notes: This figure illustrates the decisions faced by individuals with foreign accounts in following 2008-2009 
enforcement efforts. The first column divides individuals into three groups based on their compliance with FBAR 
filing and/or tax obligations. The second column examines the potential responses of each group to enforcement. 
The third column examines the additional decision by a previously non-compliant individual who opts to come 
into compliance over how to do so. We note that there are some potential behaviors not covered by this figure; 
the intention is to convey here the most likely behavior given the institutional environment.  
Figure 2: FBAR Filers and OVD Participants
 
Notes: This figure plots the total number of individuals disclosing foreign bank accounts by filing FBARs on the 
left axis and the total number of individuals participating in a Offshore Voluntary Disclosure (OVD) program 
on the right axis by year. We observe a gradually increasing trend in the number of FBAR filers prior to 2008, 


























Figure 3: New Disclosers of Foreign Accounts 
Figure 3.A. Number of new disclosers 
 
Figure 3.B: Value of accounts disclosed by new disclosers 
 
Notes: This figure describes aggregates related to “new disclosers” of foreign accounts by year. The group of “new 
discloser” in year t comprises “OVD filers” in year t and “first-time FBAR filers” in year t (defined as taxpayers with U.S. 
addresses that file an FBAR in year t and did not file an FBAR in years t-1, t-2 and t-3). Panel A plots the number of new 
disclosers excluding OVD filers (blue line) and including OVD filers (red line).  Panel B plots the total account values 
disclosed by new disclosers excluding OVD filers (blue line) and including OVD filers (red line). We observe a sharp 
increase in new filers and reported assets in 2009, only a small portion of which is accounted for by OVD participants.  
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Figure 4: First-time FBAR Filers - Haven v. Non-Haven Account Holders, by U.S. vs Non-
U.S. Addresses 
 
Notes: This figure plots the number of “first-time FBAR filers” by year (defined as taxpayers that file an FBAR in year t 
and did not file an FBAR in years t-1, t-2 and t-3) normalized by the 2008 level. Series are plotted separately by whether 
the FBAR filer reports having a U.S. or non-U.S. address and by whether the FBAR filer reports holding an account in a 
tax haven. OVD participants are excluded from the tabulations in all years. We define tax havens using the OECD (2000) 
list of uncooperative tax havens plus Switzerland, Singapore, Hong Kong and Luxembourg. The 2008 levels for each 
category are: 5,025 for U.S. filers with haven accounts; 36,649 for U.S. filers with no haven accounts; 4,804 for non-U.S. 







Figure 5: Percent Change in First-time FBAR Filings, 2008-2009, by Country 
 
Notes: This figure plots the percent change from 2008 to 2009 in the number of “first-time FBAR filers” (defined as taxpayers that file an FBAR in year t and did not 
file an FBAR in years t-1, t-2 and t-3) by the country in which new filers reported accounts. OVD participants and non-US address filers are excluded from the tabulations. 
Tax havens are shown with red bars; we define tax havens using the OECD (2000) list of uncooperative tax havens plus Switzerland, Singapore, Hong Kong and 





Figure 6: First-time FBAR Filers, by Account Value, 2005-2011 
 
Notes: This figure plots the number of “first-time FBAR filers” (defined as taxpayers that file an FBAR in year t 
and did not file an FBAR in years t-1, t-2 and t-3) by year and by the value of the largest account disclosed. All 
series are normalized by the 2008 level. OVD participants and non-US address filers are excluded from the 
tabulations. The 2008 levels are 6,059 filers, 25,427 filers, 8,893 filers, and 1,295 filers for the four categories, 
respectively, in ascending order of the account value categories. 
Figure 7: Additional Account Disclosures for Previous FBAR Filers 
 
Notes: This figure plots the number of taxpayers in year t who filed an FBAR in year t-1 and discloses at least 
one additional account on the FBAR filed in year t. We count individuals who previously disclosed only one 
account and start declaring multiple accounts (green line), individuals who previously disclosed only non-haven 
accounts who start disclosing haven accounts (blue line), and individuals who previously only disclosed small 
accounts and start disclosing large (>$1 million) accounts (red line). OVD participants and non-US address filers 
are excluded from the tabulations. All series are normalized by the 2008 level. We define tax havens using the 
OECD (2000) list of uncooperative tax havens plus Switzerland, Singapore, Hong Kong and Luxembourg. 
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Figure 8: Account Characteristics among OVD Participants and FBAR Compliers 
Figure 8.A. Account Value 
  
Figure 8.B: Account Country 
  
Notes: This figure compares the characteristics of accounts disclosed by OVD participants to the estimated 
characteristics of accounts disclosed by “first-time FBAR filers” who were induced to file in 2009 because of 
enforcement (denoted FBAR compliers – see the main text for details). Panel A compares the distribution of 
account values for the two groups (as well as a third group comprising all “first-time FBAR filers” in 2009). Panel 
B compares the distribution of account country for the two groups.  
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Figure 9: Event Study of Reported Income for OVD Participants 
Figure 9.A: Interest, Dividends and Capital Gains     
 
Figure 9.B: Total Capital Income  
   
Notes: The figure illustrates how individuals participating in the OVD in 2009 changed the reporting of various types of 
capital income around participation. The sample includes OVD participants as well as a comparison group of non- 
participants that filed FBARs continuously from 2006 to 2009 and reported the same number of accounts on their FBARs 
in each of these years. We illustrate the results from four separate regressions where the dependent variables are reported 
interest income, dividend income and capital gains (Panel A) and total capital income (Panel B) respectively. The dependent 
variables are transformed with the inverse hyperbolic sine function. The explanatory variables are individual fixed effects; 
a full set of interactions between calendar year dummies and four age group dummies; and a set of event-year dummies 
indicating the year relative to OVD participation (coded zero for the comparison group). The figure illustrates the 
estimated coefficients on the event-year dummies as well as 95% confidence intervals (based on standard errors clustered 
at the individual level).   
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Figure 10: Event Study of Reported Income for First-Time FBAR Filers 
Figure 10.A: Interest, Dividends, and Capital Gains 
 
Figure 10.B: Total Capital Income 
     
Notes: The figure illustrates how “first-time FBAR filers” in 2009 changed the reporting of various types of capital income 
around first-time filing. The sample includes “first-time FBAR filers” in 2009 as well as a comparison group that filed 
FBARs continuously from 2006 to 2009 and reported the same number of accounts on their FBARs in each of these years. 
We illustrate the results from four separate regressions where the dependent variables are reported interest income, 
dividend income and capital gains (Panel A) and total capital income (Panel B) respectively. The dependent variables are 
transformed with the inverse hyperbolic sine function. The explanatory variables are individual fixed effects; a full set of 
interactions between calendar year dummies and four age group dummies; and a set of event-year dummies indicating the 
year relative to first-time filing (coded zero for the comparison group). The figure illustrates the estimated coefficients on 
the event-year dummies as well as 95% confidence intervals (based on standard errors clustered at the individual level). 
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Figure 11: Decomposing Reported Income in Event Study of First-Time Filers 
Figure 11.A: Interest   
 
Figure 11.B: Dividends 
 
Notes: The figure illustrates how “first-time FBAR filers” in 2009 changed the reporting of various types of capital income 
around first-time filing. The sample includes “first-time FBAR filers” in 2009 as well as a comparison group that filed 
FBARs continuously from 2006 to 2009 and reported the same number of accounts on their FBARs in each of these years. 
We illustrate the results from six separate regressions where the dependent variables measure interest income (Panel A) 
and dividend income (Panel B) respectively. In both cases, there are separate regressions for income reported by domestic 
financial institutions (on Forms 1099-INT and 1099-DIV); income reported by the taxpayer but not by domestic financial 
institutions; and total income. The dependent variables are transformed with the inverse hyperbolic sine function. The 
explanatory variables are individual fixed effects; a full set of interactions between calendar year dummies and four age 
group dummies; and a set of event-year dummies indicating the year relative to first-time filing (coded zero for the 
comparison group). The figure illustrates the estimated coefficients on the event-year dummies as well as 95% confidence 
intervals (based on standard errors clustered at the individual level).
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Table 1: Characteristics of FBAR filers and accounts in 2008 and 2009 
  2008   2009 
Total number of FBAR filers 247,106 100%   330,525 100% 
 U.S. address 150,362 61%   230,723 70% 
 non-U.S. address 96,744 39%   99,802 30% 
            
 haven account 39,584 16%   64,584 20% 
 no haven account 207,522 84%   265,941 80% 
            
 amended return 2,767 1%   4,581 1% 
 no amended return 244,339 99%   325,944 99% 
            
 multiple accounts  145,992 59%   213,975 65% 
 single account 101,114 41%   116,550 35% 
Total number of FBAR accounts 721,091 100%   1,297,591 100% 
 Europe 322,727 45%   574,248 44% 
 Asia 176,252 24%   329,911 25% 
 North America 199,702 28%   350,834 27% 
 Other 22,410 3%   42,598 3% 
            
 <$10,000 242,769 34%   367,801 28% 
 $10,000 - $100,000 341,759 47%   601,317 46% 
 $100,000 - $1 million 118,894 16%   264,259 20% 
 >$1 million 17,669 2%   64,214 5% 
Notes: This table summarizes the characteristics of all FBAR filers and their foreign accounts in 2008 (left panel) and 2009 
(right panel), which serves as the baseline for our analysis of the increase in reporting from 2008 to 2009. The upper half 
of the table describes “FBAR filers” while the bottom half describes “FBAR accounts”. “U.S. address” indicates that the 
filer reports a U.S. address on the FBAR; “haven account” indicates whether at least one of the reported accounts is in a 
tax haven (defined using the OECD (2000) list of uncooperative tax havens plus Switzerland, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Luxembourg); “amended return” indicates that the individual filed an amended tax return for an earlier fiscal year; 
“multiple accounts” indicates that the individual reports more than one foreign account on the FBAR; “Europe”, “Asia”, 
“North America” indicate in which region the account is held; “<$10.000”, “$10.000-$100.000”, “$100.000-$1 million” 




Table 2: Statistics on Reported Income in the Year before Disclosure  
OVD Participants               
Income mean median p25 p75 p90 p99 
Interest             78,317             7,924           1,136            31,603            103,667             952,520  
Dividends             67,463             6,231              253            30,482              94,557             806,017  
Capital Gains             42,472             2,139  0           15,169              56,469             532,772  
Wages           199,754           37,209  0         155,200            364,250          2,253,626  
AGI           781,731         177,080         78,873          427,060         1,236,501        10,266,601  
Total Tax           175,310           25,193           6,076            90,541            277,893          2,451,757  
Sched C Income             25,787  0 0 0             22,226             441,208  
Sched E Income           117,307  0 0           12,000            179,009          2,811,869  
              
First-time Filers             
Income mean median p25 p75 p90 p99 
Interest             57,692             1,240              112              8,009              44,537             970,424  
Dividends             57,968                369  0             6,442              49,889             850,591  
Capital Gains             42,551                118  0             3,474              29,456             550,640  
Wages           280,804         114,126         19,290          238,357            481,447          3,073,700  
AGI           649,312         159,224         72,466          335,236            885,327        10,059,205  
Total Tax           156,427           21,622           4,570            65,140            203,777          2,372,693  
Sched C Income             17,865  0 0 0               9,811             363,155  
Sched E Income           123,919  0 0 0             57,866          3,033,635  
              
Comparison Group Filers           
Income mean median p25 p75 p90 p99 
Interest             53,288             3,659              496            15,262              52,050             745,906  
Dividends             76,831             2,403  0           16,935              69,607             951,457  
Capital Gains             55,479                678  0             7,639              38,585             639,977  
Wages           259,340           98,700  0         224,562            472,293          2,736,528  
AGI           661,073         166,995         78,664          356,801            972,078          9,755,223  
Total Tax           142,965           21,611           4,736            63,841            194,384          2,027,565  
Sched C Income             11,846  0 0 0               6,909             297,234  
Sched E Income             90,962  0 0 0             22,523          1,956,672  
Notes: This table describes the distribution of various types of income for three distinct groups of individuals: individuals 
participating in the OVD in 2009 (upper panel); “first-time FBAR filers” in 2009 (middle panel); and the comparison 
group of individuals filing FBARs continuously from 2006 to 2009 and reporting the same number of accounts on their 
FBARs in each of these years (bottom panel). “Capital gains” includes realized capital gains and losses; “AGI” stands for 
Adjusted Gross Income; “Schedule C Income” is income from sole-proprietorships; “Schedule E Income” is income from 
pass-through businesses; “p25”, “p75”, “p90” and “p95” refer to the 25th, 75th, 90th and 95th percentiles respectively. All 




















OVD Participants         
     Direct 20,700 691 0.033 184 
     Indirect 20,700 454 0.022 121 
First-time Filers         
     Direct 114,467 3,580 0.031 1,052 
     Indirect 114,467 1,568 0.014 460 
Total         
     Direct 135,167 4,271 0.032 1,236 
     Indirect 135,167 2,022 0.015 581 
Notes: This table summarizes our estimates of the change in total reported capital income and tax revenues using the 
direct and indirect method as described in Section 6.3 of the text. The first column shows the total assets reported by first-
time filers and OVD participants as given in Figure 3.B. For the Direct Method (rows 1 and 3), the change in total reported 
capital income (col. 2) is derived by applying the coefficients from year t+1 of the event-studies uniformly to the reported 
log income of first-time filers and OVD participants and aggregating across individuals. The coefficients are applied 
separately to interest, dividends and capital gains (Figures 9.A and 10.A). ![#$%$]  is calculated by dividing the change in 
reported income by the total reported assets. We assume that newly reported income is taxed at the top marginal rate, 35% 
for interest and the preferred 15% rate for realized capital gains and dividends. The revenue estimates are derived by 
applying these rates to the estimated change in reported income from each source. For the Indirect Method (rows 2 and 
4), we first convert the year t+1 event-study coefficient for total financial capital income (Figures 9.B and 10.B) to their 
implied percent changes in income. We then use Eq. (4) to estimate ![#$%$] using the mean ratio of reported assets to 
reported capital income, E[Vi/yi] (trimmed at the 95th percentile), which is 51.26 for OVD participants and 46.17 for first-
time filers. The compliance adjusted rate of return is then applied to the total reported assets to derive the change in total 
reported capital income (col. 2). The revenue estimates are derived using the average capital income tax rates from the 
direct method. The final two rows report the total the effects for OVD participants and first-time filers combined. 
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Figure A.1: First-time FBAR filers, amended vs. non-amended, 2005-2011 
 
Notes: This figure plots the number of “first-time FBAR filers” in year t (defined as taxpayers that file an FBAR in year t 
and did not file an FBAR in years t-1, t-2 and t-3) by year and by whether the new filer also filed late/amended FBARs for 
prior years. OVD participants and non-US address filers are excluded from the tabulations. The series are normalized by 
the 2008 level. The overall number of late/amended FBARs is small, but we observe an enormous increase in 




Figure A.2: Event Study of Reported Income for OVD Participants 
Figure A.2.A: Other Income Sources 
 
Figure A.2.B: Propensity to Report Positive Capital Income 
 
Notes: The figure illustrates how individuals participating in the OVD in 2009 changed the reporting of various types of 
capital income around participation. The sample includes OVD participants as well as a comparison group of non- 
participants that filed FBARs continuously from 2006 to 2009 and reported the same number of accounts on their FBARs 
in each of these years. We illustrate the results from four separate regressions where the dependent variables are reported 
wage / salary income, Schedule C income (from sole-proprietorships) and Schedule E income (from pass-through 
businesses) (Panel A) and a dummy indicating whether the individual reported any capital income (Panel B) respectively. 
The first three dependent variables are transformed with the inverse hyperbolic sine function. The explanatory variables 
are individual fixed effects; a full set of interactions between calendar year dummies and four age group dummies; and a 
set of event-year dummies indicating the year relative to OVD participation (coded zero for the comparison group). The 
figure illustrates the estimated coefficients on the event-year dummies as well as 95% confidence intervals (based on 
standard errors clustered at the individual level).  
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Figure A.3: Event Study of Reported Income for First-Time FBAR Filers 
Figure A.3.A: Other Income Sources 
 
Figure A.3.B: Propensity to Report Positive Capital Income 
 
Notes: The figure illustrates how “first-time FBAR filers” in 2009 changed the reporting of various types of capital income 
around first-time filing. The sample includes “first-time FBAR filers” in 2009 as well as a comparison group that filed 
FBARs continuously from 2006 to 2009 and reported the same number of accounts on their FBARs in each of these years. 
We illustrate the results from four separate regressions where the dependent variables are reported wage / salary income, 
Schedule C income (from sole-proprietorships) and Schedule E income (from pass-through businesses) (Panel A) and a 
dummy indicating whether the individual reported any capital income (Panel B) respectively. The first three dependent 
variables are transformed with the inverse hyperbolic sine function. The explanatory variables are individual fixed effects; 
a full set of interactions between calendar year dummies and four age group dummies; and a set of event-year dummies 
indicating the year relative to first-time filing (coded zero for the comparison group). The figure illustrates the estimated 
coefficients on the event-year dummies as well as 95% confidence intervals (based on standard errors clustered at the 
individual level).  
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Figure A.4: Decomposing Reported Income in Event Study of OVD Participants 
Figure A.4.A: Interest   
 
Figure A.4.B: Dividends 
 
Notes: The figure illustrates how individuals participating in the OVD in 2009 changed the reporting of various types of 
capital income around participation. The sample includes OVD participants as well as a comparison group of non- 
participants that filed FBARs continuously from 2006 to 2009 and reported the same number of accounts on their FBARs 
in each of these years. We illustrate the results from six separate regressions where the dependent variables measure interest 
income (Panel A) and dividend income (Panel B) respectively. In both cases, there are separate regressions for income 
reported by domestic financial institutions (on Forms 1099-INT and 1099-DIV); income reported by the taxpayer but not 
by domestic financial institutions; and total income. The dependent variables are transformed with the inverse hyperbolic 
sine function. The explanatory variables are individual fixed effects; a full set of interactions between calendar year 
dummies and four age group dummies; and a set of event-year dummies indicating the year relative to first-time filing 
(coded zero for the comparison group). The figure illustrates the estimated coefficients on the event-year dummies as well 
as 95% confidence intervals (based on standard errors clustered at the individual level). 
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Figure A.5: Probability of Amending Returns Relative to First-Time Filing  
 
Notes: The figure illustrates how “first-time FBAR filers” in 2009 changed their amendment behavior around 
first-time filing. The sample includes “first-time FBAR filers” in 2009 as well as a comparison group that filed 
FBARs continuously from 2006 to 2009 and reported the same number of accounts on their FBARs in each of 
these years. We illustrate the results from a regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for amending 
a tax return from one of the previous four fiscal years in year t.  The explanatory variables are individual fixed 
effects; a full set of interactions between calendar year dummies and four age group dummies; and a set of event-
year dummies indicating the year relative to first-time filing (coded zero for the comparison group). The figure 
illustrates the estimated coefficients on the event-year dummies as well as 95% confidence intervals (based on 












Figure A.6: The Ratio of Account Value to Previously Reported Capital Income 
Figure A.6.A OVD Participants 
 
Figure A.6.B First-Time Filers 
 
Note: This table reports quantiles of the ratio of total FBAR account value to capital income in the year before disclosure, 
by rank in the total capital income distribution. We rank individuals according to their rank among OVD participants or 
first-time filers rather than the entire population, for simplicity. To obtain total FBAR account value, we add across 
accounts if the individual reported multiple accounts. Results are very similar when using the maximum account value. 
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Table A.1. Event Study of Reported Income for OVD Participants 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 














                  
Treat*Event time -4 -0.029175 -0.057727* 0.016821 0.037654* -0.007327 0.058100 0.038931 0.010047*** 
  (0.026707) (0.030120) (0.032029) (0.022605) (0.040473) (0.055647) (0.085228) (0.002312) 
Treat*Event time -3 0.021958 -0.059572** 0.005719 0.039458** 0.021428 0.128868** 0.050949 0.008329*** 
  (0.023203) (0.026812) (0.028097) (0.019315) (0.034816) (0.051529) (0.080403) (0.002055) 
 Treat*Event time -2 0.044765** -0.019143 -0.024690 0.011432 -0.000479 0.113871** 0.056469 -0.000465 
  (0.018988) (0.020620) (0.022403) (0.015774) (0.026628) (0.044487) (0.070746) (0.001786) 
Treat*Event time 0 0.185001*** 0.162393*** 0.042006* 0.165828*** -0.001025 0.046455 -0.262716*** 0.005046*** 
  (0.020885) (0.023374) (0.024557) (0.017236) (0.026585) (0.044802) (0.072467) (0.001665) 
Treat*Event time 1 1.061388*** 0.485858*** 0.210601*** 0.753838*** 0.019130 0.065406 0.026733 0.028829*** 
  (0.028153) (0.031864) (0.031042) (0.023409) (0.035218) (0.052750) (0.082196) (0.002099) 
Treat*Event time 2 1.134727*** 0.480929*** 0.241685*** 0.799247*** 0.005162 0.042808 0.029695 0.034735*** 
  (0.030936) (0.035515) (0.034463) (0.026278) (0.041065) (0.055308) (0.085322) (0.002310) 
Treat*Event time 3 1.071524*** 0.470303*** 0.281265*** 0.754004*** -0.010627 -0.098829* 0.042438 0.036872*** 
  (0.032937) (0.038258) (0.037223) (0.028474) (0.045553) (0.058041) (0.089809) (0.002496) 
Treat*Event time 4 0.982369*** 0.461347*** 0.336528*** 0.712861*** 0.037769 -0.133514** 0.045213 0.038090*** 
  (0.033911) (0.039553) (0.038973) (0.028882) (0.049007) (0.059603) (0.091928) (0.002524) 
                  
Observations 478,350 478,350 478,350 478,350 478,350 478,349 478,289 478,350 
R-squared 0.761839 0.842375 0.838480 0.815430 0.851059 0.582259 0.550560 0.540362 
Standard errors clustered at the individual-level             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               
Note: This table reports the regression coefficients plotted in Figure 9 and Figure A.2. 
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Table A.2 Event Study of Reported Total Financial Capital Income for OVD Participants, Alternative Specifications 






Sine, exclude zeros 
in t-1 
Inverse Hyperbolic 
Sine, drop all zeros 







              
Treat*Event time -4 0.037654* 0.005081 -0.029644* -0.029395* -0.037224** -0.037178** 
  (0.022605) (0.020643) (0.016643) (0.016659) (0.016167) (0.016177) 
Treat*Event time -3 0.039458** 0.018690 -0.010703 -0.010569 -0.022539* -0.022546* 
  (0.019315) (0.017439) (0.014151) (0.014165) (0.013045) (0.013048) 
 Treat*Event time -2 0.011432 -0.009314 0.012446 0.012590 -0.011175 -0.011215 
  (0.015774) (0.014017) (0.010792) (0.010805) (0.009432) (0.009439) 
Treat*Event time 0 0.165828*** 0.127633*** 0.125404*** 0.125334*** 0.115259*** 0.115256*** 
  (0.017236) (0.014508) (0.012373) (0.012384) (0.010952) (0.010954) 
Treat*Event time 1 0.753838*** 0.636726*** 0.556000*** 0.556174*** 0.503996*** 0.504088*** 
  (0.023409) (0.019300) (0.017120) (0.017134) (0.016135) (0.016141) 
Treat*Event time 2 0.799247*** 0.676470*** 0.581748*** 0.582241*** 0.527037*** 0.527267*** 
  (0.026278) (0.022319) (0.018853) (0.018866) (0.018056) (0.018060) 
Treat*Event time 3 0.754004*** 0.634043*** 0.529969*** 0.530541*** 0.483549*** 0.483821*** 
  (0.028474) (0.024925) (0.019898) (0.019914) (0.019104) (0.019111) 
Treat*Event time 4 0.712861*** 0.609308*** 0.455921*** 0.456233*** 0.421575*** 0.421801*** 
  (0.028882) (0.025562) (0.021384) (0.021408) (0.020807) (0.020820) 
              
Observations 478,350 461,787 455,201 455,201 370,521 370,521 
R-squared 0.815430 0.799785 0.854775 0.854481 0.847574 0.847410 
Standard errors clustered at the individual-level         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
Note: This table reports several alternative specifications of the estimation of equation (1) on the impact of disclosure on reported total financial capital income. Column 
(1) is identical column (4) of Table A.1. Column (2) drops zeros in event year -1, as these individuals are also excluded from the analysis in Table A.8. Column (3) drops 
all observations of zero financial capital income. Columns (4) is similar to column (3), but use a traditional logarithmic transform instead of an inverse hyperbolic sine 
transform. In columns (5) and (6) we estimate the regression on a balanced panel of taxpayers using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation and natural log of the 




Table A.3. Event Study of Reported Income for First-Time FBAR Filers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 














                  
Treat*Event time -4 -0.055918*** -0.042793** 0.018690 -0.020675 0.111576*** 0.064331* 0.090001* 0.006922*** 
  (0.019564) (0.021372) (0.022413) (0.017233) (0.026812) (0.037355) (0.053483) (0.001942) 
Treat*Event time -3 -0.017580 -0.032300* -0.007597 0.000033 0.114827*** 0.064385* 0.173038*** 0.008481*** 
  (0.017347) (0.018763) (0.019421) (0.015299) (0.022848) (0.033960) (0.050408) (0.001802) 
 Treat*Event time -2 0.026820** -0.012978 -0.008248 0.020076* 0.077914*** 0.042086 0.038655 0.004350*** 
  (0.013662) (0.014861) (0.015861) (0.012129) (0.017451) (0.028885) (0.043218) (0.001470) 
Treat*Event time 0 0.319700*** 0.112550*** 0.026411* 0.282919*** -0.043702** 0.040283 -0.264761*** 0.027352*** 
  (0.014178) (0.015046) (0.015909) (0.012689) (0.017543) (0.028532) (0.043614) (0.001484) 
Treat*Event time 1 0.615175*** 0.199839*** 0.097733*** 0.487019*** -0.029693 -0.038166 -0.110621** 0.041902*** 
  (0.017974) (0.019377) (0.019496) (0.015594) (0.023151) (0.033502) (0.049170) (0.001713) 
Treat*Event time 2 0.599319*** 0.208778*** 0.124829*** 0.448476*** -0.067314** 0.000180 -0.064777 0.036002*** 
  (0.019890) (0.022310) (0.021873) (0.017546) (0.027108) (0.036470) (0.052511) (0.001854) 
Treat*Event time 3 0.561062*** 0.229531*** 0.138683*** 0.407835*** -0.050795* -0.041437 -0.135222** 0.033437*** 
  (0.021647) (0.024515) (0.023986) (0.019426) (0.030109) (0.038618) (0.055485) (0.001995) 
Treat*Event time 4 0.549502*** 0.231005*** 0.168012*** 0.372131*** 0.019500 -0.024127 -0.060041 0.027288*** 
  (0.022800) (0.025752) (0.025396) (0.020432) (0.032584) (0.040694) (0.058237) (0.002062) 
                  
Observations 829,533 829,533 829,533 829,533 829,533 829,529 829,396 829,533 
R-squared 0.768602 0.840233 0.837671 0.814067 0.811797 0.544995 0.524623 0.555718 
Standard errors clustered at the individual-level             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               




Table A.4. Decomposing Reported Income in Event Study of OVD Participants  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Non-1099 
Interest 1099 Interest  Total Interest 
Non-1099 
Dividends 1099 Dividends  Total Dividends 
              
Treat*Event time -4 0.031721 0.017593 -0.029175 -0.190026*** -0.046174 -0.057727* 
  (0.059001) (0.028420) (0.026707) (0.064532) (0.029697) (0.030120) 
Treat*Event time -3 0.027553 0.037893 0.021958 -0.043539 -0.052621** -0.059572** 
  (0.056360) (0.024938) (0.023203) (0.058376) (0.025717) (0.026812) 
 Treat*Event time -2 0.070952 0.045496** 0.044765** -0.065139 -0.029641 -0.019143 
  (0.051329) (0.019601) (0.018988) (0.054460) (0.019067) (0.020620) 
Treat*Event time 0 0.628838*** -0.027716 0.185001*** 0.451373*** 0.001383 0.162393*** 
  (0.054244) (0.020194) (0.020885) (0.059206) (0.019670) (0.023374) 
Treat*Event time 1 2.640293*** 0.192859*** 1.061388*** 1.712129*** -0.088023*** 0.485858*** 
  (0.065537) (0.028203) (0.028153) (0.065330) (0.027385) (0.031864) 
Treat*Event time 2 2.232641*** 0.487279*** 1.134727*** 1.386312*** 0.049200 0.480929*** 
  (0.067445) (0.031344) (0.030936) (0.065920) (0.032772) (0.035515) 
Treat*Event time 3 1.684172*** 0.767485*** 1.071524*** 1.130801*** 0.133530*** 0.470303*** 
  (0.069902) (0.033668) (0.032937) (0.071590) (0.035728) (0.038258) 
Treat*Event time 4 1.551593*** 0.663944*** 0.982369*** 0.996238*** 0.147849*** 0.461347*** 
  (0.069096) (0.036205) (0.033911) (0.072524) (0.038685) (0.039553) 
              
Observations 478,341 478,341 478,350 478,340 478,341 478,350 
R-squared 0.576671 0.767779 0.761839 0.568226 0.861470 0.842375 
Standard errors clustered at the individual-level         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           




Table A.5. Decomposing Reported Income in Event Study of First-Time FBAR Filers  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Non-1099 
Interest 1099 Interest  Total Interest 
Non-1099 
Dividends 1099 Dividends  Total Dividends 
              
Treat*Event time -4 0.109163*** -0.070468*** -0.055918*** -0.213678*** -0.036008* -0.042793** 
  (0.037077) (0.021219) (0.019564) (0.039639) (0.020701) (0.021372) 
Treat*Event time -3 0.050156 -0.043082** -0.017580 -0.130187*** -0.019542 -0.032300* 
  (0.034487) (0.018749) (0.017347) (0.035523) (0.017736) (0.018763) 
 Treat*Event time -2 0.020062 -0.004187 0.026820** -0.066999** -0.012213 -0.012978 
  (0.030984) (0.014507) (0.013662) (0.032061) (0.013382) (0.014861) 
Treat*Event time 0 0.749249*** 0.049669*** 0.319700*** 0.269119*** -0.064529*** 0.112550*** 
  (0.031612) (0.014572) (0.014178) (0.033294) (0.013266) (0.015046) 
Treat*Event time 1 1.215824*** 0.259789*** 0.615175*** 0.339037*** -0.003119 0.199839*** 
  (0.037404) (0.019562) (0.017974) (0.035280) (0.018205) (0.019377) 
Treat*Event time 2 1.139670*** 0.297143*** 0.599319*** 0.322458*** 0.047191** 0.208778*** 
  (0.038324) (0.021409) (0.019890) (0.037248) (0.021780) (0.022310) 
Treat*Event time 3 1.127410*** 0.283152*** 0.561062*** 0.376952*** 0.090953*** 0.229531*** 
  (0.040379) (0.022850) (0.021647) (0.041276) (0.023776) (0.024515) 
Treat*Event time 4 1.101122*** 0.303910*** 0.549502*** 0.297557*** 0.110638*** 0.231005*** 
  (0.041184) (0.024423) (0.022800) (0.042471) (0.025432) (0.025752) 
              
Observations 829,532 829,533 829,533 829,531 829,533 829,533 
R-squared 0.607445 0.746965 0.768602 0.603660 0.851211 0.840233 
Standard errors clustered at the individual-level         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           




Table A.6. Probability of Amending Returns Relative to First-Time Filing 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Amend 
    
Treat*Event time -4 -0.004717*** 
  (0.001799) 
Treat*Event time -3 -0.008348*** 
  (0.001888) 
Treat*Event time -2 -0.003798** 
  (0.001850) 
Treat*Event time 0 0.033132*** 
  (0.002020) 
Treat*Event time 1 0.016392*** 
  (0.001960) 
Treat*Event time 2 0.005307*** 
  (0.001892) 
Treat*Event time 3 0.000590 
  (0.002070) 
Treat*Event time 4 -0.002472 
  (0.001889) 
    
Observations 829,533 
R-squared 0.160275 
Standard errors clustered at the individual-level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 










Change in Total 
Reported Capital 




OVD Participants         
     Interest 1.06 403 0.35 141 
     Dividends 0.49 218 0.15 33 
     Capital Gains 0.21 70 0.15 11 
     Total   691 0.27 184 
First-time Filers         
     Interest 0.62 2,573 0.35 901 
     Dividends 0.20 970 0.15 146 
     Capital Gains 0.10 37 0.15 6 
     Total   3,580 0.29 1,052 
Notes: This table constructs the estimate of the total effect on reported capital income and tax revenues using the “direct 
method” described in the text, i.e. assuming a uniform treatment effect. The first column reports the coefficient from the 
event study for each type of capital income for year t+1. The change in total reported capital income (col. 2) is derived by 
applying these coefficients uniformly to the reported log interest, dividends and capital gains of each first-time filer and 
OVD participant and aggregating across individuals. We assume for simplicity that realized capital gains and dividends are 
taxed at the preferred rate, which was 15 percent in the top tax bracket in the period we study. The last column multiplies 












E[Vi/yi]           
(trimmed 





Change in Total Reported 
Capital Income (millions)                        
(total reported assets * E[d*r]) 
OVD Participants 0.75 1.13 51.26 0.022 20,700 454 
First-Time Filers 0.49 0.63 46.17 0.014 114,467 1,568 
Notes: This table constructs the estimate of the total effect on reported capital income and tax revenues using the “indirect method” described in the text. We first 
convert the coefficient from total financial capital income in the event studies (col. 1) to the implied percent change in income (col. 2). We then use Eq. (4) to estimate ![#$%$] from the reported statistics in the second and third columns. We apply this via Eq. (2) to the total reported assets (as shown in Figure 3.B and reported in col. 









Change in Total 
Reported Capital 
Income 
(millions) E[d*r] E[r] E[d] 
OVD Participants           
       Direct Method 20,700 691 0.033 0.033 1 
       Indirect Method 20,700 454 0.022 0.022 1 
First-Time Filers           
       Direct Method 114,467 3,580 0.031 0.033 0.94 
       Indirect Method 114,467 1,568 0.014 0.022 0.62 
Notes: This table considers the implications of our results using the direct or indirect method (Tables 3, A.7 and A.8) for 
rates of return on foreign wealth. The first to columns report the total assets and total change in reported capital income. 
The third column estimates the compliance-adjusted rate of return. For the direct method, this is calculated by dividing 
the change in reported capital income by total reported assets; for the indirect method, it is calculated using Eq. (4). In the 
last two columns, we decompose the compliance adjusted rate of return into the actual rate of return for previously non-
compliant account, and the fraction of accounts that are non-compliant, under the assumption that 1) all OVD participants 
were previously non-compliant, and 2) the rate of return was the same for OVD participants and first-time filers. 
 
 
